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[do
The Court supported its decision
by analogizing to prior cases. In
Brower Vo [nyo County, 489 U.S.
593 (1989), a driver crashed into a
police blockade and was killed while
fleeing from police with flashing
sirens in a high speed car chase. The
Court addressed the issue ofwhether
the police had illegally seized the
decedent in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The Court concluded
that in Brower, "[w]e did not even
consider the possibility that a seizure could have occurred during the
course of the chase because, as we
explained, 'show of authority' did
not produce his stop." [d. at 1552
(quoting Brower, 498 U.S. at 597).
The Court also analogized the
facts of Hodari Do to the facts of
Hestervo United States, 265 U.S. 57
(1924). In Hester, revenue agents
acting without a warrant were chasing moonshiners, when the
moonshiners dropped containers.
The containers were not excluded as
illegally obtained evidence because,
"[t]he defendant's own acts, and
those ofhis associates, disclosed the
jug ... and there was no seizure in
the sense of the law when the officers examined the contents of each
after they had been abandoned." [do
(quoting Hester, 265 U.S. at 58).
Relying on such prior case law,
the Court in Hodari Do concluded
that even if the officers did display
ashow ofauthority when they chased
the defendant, Hodari did not comply and was not seized until he was
physically tackled by the officer.
[do The cocaine was not, therefore,
the fruit of an illegal seizure.
The court's holding in Hodari
Do gives a very narrow definition of
the word "seizure." This holding
represents a departure from prior
case law which defined seizure
broadly to include, for example, electronic eavesdropping as a seizure.
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Although the Court had the opportunity to enlarge the scope of reasonable justifications for seizure, it
chose instead to significantly limit
the protection ofthe Fourth Amendment.
- Elizabeth Lee

Krauss v. State: DRIVER'S
REFUSAL TO TAKE
BREATHAL YZER TEST
INADMISSIBLE.
In a 4-3 decision, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland in Krauss v.
State, 587 A.2d 1102 (Md. 1991),
held that a driver's refusal to take a
Breathalyzer test was inadmissible
when pre-test procedure and availability were not challenged. Overturning the drunk driving conviction of Frank L. Krauss, the court
ruled that evidence 0 fthe defendant's
refusal to take a Breathalyzer test
would be admissible only if material and relevant to matters other
than guilt or innocence. Because
Krauss admitted he was offered a
test and never questioned the procedure by which it was tendered, the
court concluded that the admission
of Krauss's refusal was immaterial
and irrelevant as to the issue of guilt
and, therefore, inadmissible.
Suspected of driving while intoxicated, Krauss was stopped by a
state trooper. Krauss was offered
theopportunitytotakeaBreathalyzer
test, but he refused. At the beginning of his trial, defense counsel
made a motion in limine to exclude
all evidence of Krauss's refusal to
take the test, and stipulated that the
state trooper who arrested Krauss
followed proper procedures when
attempting to administer the test.
Krauss argued that his refusal to
take the Breathalyzer test was neither material nor relevant to any
remaining issue in the case except
intoxication, for which it would be
inadmissible according to Md. Code

Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-309(a)
(1989). Krauss asserted, therefore,
that this evidence of his refusal was
highly prejudicial and that the state
should be prevented from using such
evidence. The trial judge denied the
motion, and a jury found Krauss
guilty of driving while under the
influence. Following his conviction and sentencing, Krauss appealed
to the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland, which affirmed the circuit court. Thereafter, the court of
appeals granted Krauss's petition
for a writ of certiorari.
The court of appeals began its
analysis by looking at the legislative enactments concerning drunk
driving. Krauss, 587 A.2dat 1103.
Maryland law forbids a person from
driving any vehicle while intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol. Md. Code Ann. Transp. § 21902 (1987). To facilitate the prosecution of drunk drivers, Md. Code
Ann. Transp. § 16-205. 1(a) (1987)
provides that any person who drives
a vehicle on a highway is deemed to
have consented to taking a breath
test to determine blood alcohol levels.
The court noted that the legislature had provided for the taking of
two types ofchemical breath tests: a
preliminary breath test and a
Breathalyzertest. Krauss, 587 A.2d
at 1103. The preliminary breath test
was used as a guide for police officers in deciding whether an arrest
should be made. [d. The results of
the preliminary test may be used as
evidence by the defendant but not
by the state. [d. However, the
results ofthe Breathalyzer test, or a
refusal to take the test could be
offered into evidence by the state.
[do at 1104. Upon review of the
transcript, the court determined that
Krauss's refusal was for a
Breathalyzer test. [d. at 1106.
The provisions of Md. Cts. &

Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §§ 10-302
through 10-309 (1989) outline the
proper procedures for administering the Breathalyzer test and attempt to resolve questions as to its
admissibility. Id. at 1103-05. In
1986, the legislature amended section 10-309(a) to permit the introduction of a refusal to take the
Breathalyzer test into evidence at
trial, but left unchanged thatportion
ofthe statute which stated that a jury
could make no inferences or presumptions from that evidence concerning guilt or innocence. Id. at
1106-07. The court ofappeals interpreted the language of section 10309 to mean that evidence of a refusal to submitto a Breathalyzer test
could only be applied to collateral
matters that were not material or
relevant to the defendant's guilt or
innocence, such as whether the test
was properly administered. Id. at
1107.
The court of appeals noted that
Krauss clearly stated at trial that he
would not question whether he was
properly given the opportunity to
take the Breathalyzer test. Id. at
1107. Thus, the court found, ''there
was no collateral matter in question,
and there appeared no sound reason
for the State to introduce evidence
ofthe refusal except to influence the
jury toward a verdict of guilty." Id.
at 1107-08.
The court of appeals rejected the
state's argument that the admission
of the Breathalyzer test was harmless error. Id. at 1108. Although the
facts showed some evidence that
put Krauss's sobriety into doubt,
there was also conflicting evidence
showing that Krauss had sustained a
head injury. Id. The court stated
that it was the jury's function to
weigh the evidence. Id. at 1108.
The court could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error in admitting the Breathalyzer

test in no way influenced the jury's
verdict. Id. (applying Dorsey v.
State. 350 A.2d 665, 679 (Md.
1976». Finally, the court ruled that
the trial judge's brief jury instructions did not overcome the prejudicial effect of admitting into evidence Krauss's refusal to take the
Breathalyzer test. Id.
Judge McAuliffe led the dissent
by arguing that section 10-309 was
properly drafted to avoid misapprehension and speculation on the part
of jurors. Id. at 1109. The dissent
suggested that the legislature wrote
section 10-309 to give the state an
opportunity to dispel any mistaken
belief among the jurors that the defendant had no right to refuse or was
not given the opportunity to take the
Breathalyzertest. The dissenttherefore believed that admitting the
defendant's refusal to take the test
would merely place the state on "a
level playing field." Id.
According to the decision in
Krauss, the state will no longer be
able to admit evidence that a drunk
driver refused to take a Breathalyzer
test, unless the driver first calls into
question the method by which the
test was administered. Only incases
where the defendant claims the police officer did not offer him the test
oritwasimproperlyperformedcould
the evidence of his refusal then be
admitted. The holding in Krauss
severely curtails the state's ability
to offer evidence that the defendant
refused a Breathalyzer test. Unless
the legislature decides to amend the
statute, the state has lost an important piece of trial evidence, tipping
the balance in favor of the de fendant, and, thereby resulting in fewer
drunk driving convictions.
- Karl Phillips

Lane v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co.: STATUTE OFLIMITATIONS DOES NOT BEGIN TO
RUN ON AN INSURED
MOTORIST'S CONTRACT
CLAIM UNTIL INSURER
DENIES COVERAGE.
In Lane v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 582 A.2d 501 (Md. 1990), the
Court ofAppeals of Maryland found
that in a breach of contract action by
an insured motorist against his insurance carrier, the three-year statute oflimitations began to run when
the contract was actually breached
by the insurance company when it
denied coverage under the policy.
The holding rejected the view espoused by the court of special appeals in Yingling v. Phillips, 501
A.2d 87 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985),
that an insured's breach of contract
action accrued when the insured motorist first discovered that the
tortfeasor was uninsured.
Mr. and Mrs. William Lane were
involved in an auto accident when a
vehicle driven by Guy Callaway
tried to pass them on the left-hand
side of the road. As Callaway attempted to pass the Lanes, an oncoming vehicle, driven by Joseph
Warren and owned by Michael
McKenna, forced Callaway off the
road and hit the Lanes' vehicle. The
Lanes sustained permanent injuries
from the collision. At the time of
the accident, the Lanes had an automobile liability insurance policy with
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.
(Nationwide). Nationwide was informed ofthe collision shortly after
it occurred.
In December of 1982, the Lanes
filed a tort action against Callaway,
Warren and McKenna, and notified
Nationwideofthependingsuit. Prior
to the filing of the tort action, the
Lanes discovered that neither Warren nor McKenna had automobile
insurance. The Lanes' attorney sent
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